The term "globalization" as used by social scientists and in popular discourse has many meanings. We contend that it is important to distinguish between globalization as a contemporary political ideology and what we call structural globalization-the increasing worldwide density of large-scale interaction networks relative to the density of smaller networks. We study one type of economic globalization over the past two centuries: the trajectory of international trade as a proportion of global production. Is trade globalization a recent phenomenon, a long-term upward trend, or a cyclical process? Using an improved measure of trade globalization, we find that there have been three waves since 1 795. We discuss the possible causes of these pulsations of global integration and their implications for the early decades of the twenty-first century. S ocial scientific approaches to globalization disagree about how the structure of the world economy has changed over time. Some social scientists, and much of the public, believe that in the recent past national economies were largely independent entities. It is believed that since the 1960s a new transnational economy has emerged in which national societies have become integrated into a global network of trade and an interdependent division of labor. A second perspective imagines a centuries-long trend toward increasing global integration as transportation and communications costs have declined. And yet a third approach envisions a cyclical process of phases of increased international integration followed by phases in which national economies return toward autarchy.
The term "globalization" often refers to changes in technologies of communication and transportation, increasingly internationalized financial flows and commodity trade, and the transition from national to world markets as the main arena for economic competition. The information age and the stage of global capitalism are asserted to constitute a new and qualitatively different historical epoch (Castells 1993 (Castells ,1996 Sklair 1995) . The term is also used to refer to what has been called the "Washington Consensus," or the "globalization project" (McMichael 1996) , a now-hegemonic neoliberal political ideology that celebrates the victory of capitalism over socialism and proclaims marketization and privatization as solutions to the world's problems.
STRUCTURAL GLOBALIZATION
Although we focus on economic networks, our theoretical approach does not stem from economics or even economic sociology. Rather we seek to understand continuities and changes in institutional structures of the modern world-system over the past 200 years. Institutional structures are fundamentally cultural inventions. Market exchange, firms, states, global governance organizations, and the civilizational ideologies that naturalize them are all grist for the analysis of institutional structures that forms our framework for the study of globalization.
The comparative world-systems perspective asserts, and research confirms, that interaction networks have been importantly intersocietal since the first people settled in relatively permanent villages that traded and made war with their still-nomadic neighbors (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Chase-Dunn and Mann 1998).
With the evolution of social complexity and hierarchy, the institutional nature of interaction networks has undergone major transformations. One important variable characteristic of interaction networks has been their spatial scale and the relative intensity of smaller and larger networks within a system. Comparative research reveals that both small and large world-systems exhibit the phenomenon of "pulsation" in which interaction networks alternately expand and contract (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997, chap.
10).
We focus on what we call structural globalization-changes in the density of international and global interactions relative to local or national networks. Tilly (1995) proposes a similar definition of globalization:
an increase in the geographic range of locally consequential social interactions, especially when that increase stretches a significant proportion of all interactions across international or intercontinental limits" (pp. 1-2). If national networks and global networks increase in density at the same rate, there would be no increase in the globalization of interaction.
We conceptualize structural economic and political globalization as the differential density and power of large versus small interaction networks and organizations. Although we disagree with the idea that politics and economics are separate realms that should be independent objects of scientific inquiry, it is nonetheless useful to distinguish between political and economic forms of globalization.
Economic globalization means greater integration in the organization of production, distribution, and consumption of commodities in the world economy. It seems that our breakfasts increasingly come from distant lands. But sugar has been an intercontinental commodity since the eighteenth century in the sense that global market forces and the policies of competing states have massively affected its conditions of production and consumption. Fresh grapes, on the other hand, have become a global commodity only since jets started transporting them seasonally between the southern and northern hemispheres. But if we count all the commodities and adjust for the overall growth of production, is the average breakfast more "globalized" now than it was in nineteenth century? This is the question we ask.
Political globalization is conceptualized as the institutional form of global and interregional political/military organizations (including "economic" ones such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), and their strengths relative to the strengths of national states and other smaller political actors in the world-system. This is analogous to our conceptualization of economic globalization as the relative density and importance of large versus small interaction networks.
We present here the product of a research project in which we study trajectories of different dimensions of political and economic globalization. We report results for one kind of economic globalization-the globalization of trade over the past two centuries. Trade globalization means the extent to which the long-distance and global exchange of commodities has increased (or decreased) relative to the exchange of commodities within national societies. Understanding economic globalization must necessarily also take into account the globalization of investment, but that part of our project is, as yet, incomplete.
UNIT OF ANALYSIS: THE WHOLE SYSTEM
Our research is about continuities and changes in the organization of the world-system as a whole. Thus, we operationalize trade globalization as a variable characteristic of the whole world-system. We conceptualize the world-system as a complex network of nested and overlapping subnetworks. This includes individuals, households, neighborhoods, communities, villages, towns, cities, local polities, national states, firms, political parties, classes, zones (core, periphery, and semiperiphery),' trans-national and worldwide organizations and networks of all kinds-all the local, regional, interregional, and global networks.
Our focus is not on "international relations," but rather on all the interactions of the people of the Earth, local as well as global. During the nineteenth century, the Europeancentered world-system became truly global in the sense of incorporating nearly all the remaining regions. We agree with Frank (1998) that Europe had been systemically interacting with other core regions in West, South, and East Asia for centuries. By the first half of the nineteenth century, the system had shifted from a multicore structure in which at least three separate core regions interacted with one another at a distance, to a unicore structure in which all core states had direct contacts with one another (ChaseDunn and Hall 1997).
How has the organization of this structure changed over the last 200 years? Was there a recent leap from national-level economic networks that were largely independent of one another to a global interdependent network? Or was there a long-standing upward trend from local to regional to national to international regional to global-level interactions? Or was there a cycle of changing intensity of global-level interactions relative to the intensity of local or national-level interactions?
While it would be desirable to have data on all levels of interaction, this is not possible for the whole 200 years we study. To answer our questions we must compare recent decades with earlier periods and with the nineteenth century, which requires using data on national societies because it was these entities-their states-that developed "statistics." This does not mean that our analysis is "state-centric." We have already declared that we want to focus on interaction networks at all levels, including global and transnational ones. But data for long-term comparisons are available only for national states. These data can be used if we are chary about what sorts of distortion or false inferences might be introduced by having information only on national states (Chase-Dunn 1998, chap. 15).
Many researchers who have addressed the idea of globalization see no need to examine structures that existed before a few decades past. Sklair (1995) , who focuses on transnational practices, transnational corporations, and the spread of consumerist culture, says explicitly that he sees no reason to consider what happened before the 1960s. Both he and Castells (1993 Castells ( , 1996 address globalization as if it were a phenomenon unique to recent decades.
Several different hypotheses have surfaced about the causes of trade globalization. The simplest economic explanation for the expansion of long-distance trade is the decline of transportation and communications costs. This decline is a long-term and increasingly rapid downward trend (United Nations 1999:30) tied to changes in technology, which are thus assumed to be the main driving force behind the expansion of trade globalization.
The major alternative hypothesis focuses on the structure of power in the international system of states. The general term for this approach is "hegemonic stability," although there are important differences in the various ways that hegemony is conceptualized and different hypotheses about the nature of the causal connections between hegemony and trade globalization. The general idea, however, is that the international system is more than an "anarchy" of states competing and fighting with one another. World order is seen as a product of international competition and cooperation. There is greater order and more peaceful interaction when a single hegemonic state has sufficient power to influence or coerce other states and international actors. Hegemony is sequential, in that there is a systemic cycle of the rise and fall Core countries have greater economic and political/military power (the United States, Europe, and Japan), while peripheral countries are poor and have weak states (most countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America). In between is a group of countries (the semiperiphery) that has intermediate levels of power either because of their large size or because of intermediate levels of development (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, India, Taiwan, Korea). The core-periphery hierarchy is a relatively stable structure with most countries maintaining their relative positions over the centuries, but there are a few cases of upward and downward mobility within the structure. The United States is perhaps the most dramatic example of upward mobility. In political science a similar approach has been advanced by those who study "international regimes" (Keohane 1984; Krasner 1983 ) and the "epistemic communities" of scientists and policy leaders who formulate key universalistic ideologies (Hass 1990; Whiteneck 1998). The international liberalism of the British hegemony, the "free world" ideology of the United States after World War II, and the neo-liberal "Washington Consensus" (that legitimates free trade and the International Monetary Fund's "structural adjustment programs") are all examples of the ideological aspects of hegemony that are alleged to be major causes of greater trade globalization.
Conflict
The fourth argument linking hegemony and trade globalization focuses on the economic aspects of hegemony, especially the role played by international capitalists from the hegemon and allied core powers in promoting international investment. Investment globalization (increases in the amount of international capital invested relative to the amount invested within countries) is seen as the major cause of trade globalization.
Hegemony, in this approach, is seen as the predominance of a particular kind of "accumulation regime" that is first brought to perfection by a rising hegemon and then is adopted by competitors in other states (Kotz, McDonough, and Reich 1994; Lipietz 1987 ). An accumulation regime is an unusually profitable combination of new technologies, economic organization, and class relations that expands world markets by producing key goods relatively cheaply. For example, the British in the nineteenth century led the adoption of large-scale mass production firms using coal-fired steam generators to produce textiles, machinery, steamships, and railroad equipment. U.S. hegemony was based on so-called "Fordism"-large corporately held firms that developed assembly-line mass production using oil-based energy and "business unionism" labor relations, in which unions agreed to contend with capital only about wages and working conditions.
The most recent accumulation regime-"flexible specialization"-is based on information technology that allows for the profitable production of small batches of customized goods by small firms who employ nonunionized skilled workers who must continually learn new techniques. Although technology is an important component of the accumulation regime approach, class relations and economic organization are also important, and thus the rise of new accumulation regimes is an uneven and cyclical process rather than a smooth upward trend.
A related approach is that of Arrighi (1994), whose formulation of the rise and fall of "systemic cycles of accumulation" notes the important shift toward emphasis on finance capital that occurs in the waning stages of a hegemony. Although this took somewhat different organizational forms in the evolution from Genoese to Dutch to British to U.S. hegemonies, each hegemon saw the hyperdevelopment of profit-making from financial transactions in the period in which their comparative advantages in production and trade were declining. In these approaches, trade globalization is seen as primarily a consequence of investment globalization. Waves of investment globalization are tied to changes in the economics of transportation and communications, but also to changes in class relations and capital's relationship with states.
We do not operationalize and test these causal propositions. Rather we examine only the temporal trajectory of trade globalization. But the trajectory has implications for the different explanations presented. A second problem involves the need to transform local country currencies into a comparable standard in order to sum values 2 While it is well known that nonmonetized exchanges and use values comprise a greater proportion of the economy in less developed countries (where relatively more people engage in subsistence agriculture), monetization of interaction has been an important historical process over the period we study. This could be a source of error in our effort to quantify globalization. We look only at monetized action during a period in which it expanded to become an ever-greater proportion of all action. If this expansion had been even with regard to national-level and international exchange this would not be a problem, but it is plausible that international exchange has always been more monetized than local exchange, and so the rates of change might not be the same. If that were true, we might underestimate the true longterm trend of trade globalization because national economies in the nineteenth century were larger than is indicated by counting only monetized income. (We thank John Boli for raising this important point.)
3 Ideally we would like to be able to use network analysis to study long-term change in the world-system, but data constraints make it impossible to compare the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Su's (1995) fine network study of world trade examines the year 1938 and compares it with more recent decades. 4 Our data are mainly from Mitchell (1992 Mitchell ( , 1993 Mitchell ( , 1995 and include a mix of GDP, GNP, and net national product (NNP, also called national income). NNP includes disposable income of individuals, institutions, and governments after providing for the maintenance and depreciation of capital stocks. GNP and GDP include depreciation and maintenance outlays. For most countries before 1940, the figures in Mitchell are NNP (Mitchell 1992:887 rubles, yen, etc.) (Mitchell 1992 (Mitchell , 1993 (Mitchell , 1995 .
By computing the ratio using local country currency units in both the numerator and the denominator, the currency units drop out. This ratio, then, makes levels of openness comparable across countries and eliminates the need to convert data into constant U.S. dollars. Thus, from the local country currency data we compute a ratio for each country. We do not sum the imports of all the countries and then sum the GDPs because these values from Mitchell are in different currency units. But we use country ratios to estimate the world level of trade globalization, thus eliminating the problematic assumptions discussed above.
Recall that the measure of trade globalization in Figure 2 from the nineteenth century jumped from 1820 to 1870 and then to 1900. While the openness measure allows finer time resolution, it suffers from spatial incompleteness as we go back in time.9 This means that we are using a "sample" to estimate trade globalization, but one that is not randomly chosen. Generally, the core countries have more complete data early on, whereas for peripheral countries we have only recent data. Because we are interested in both the temporal ups and downs and in the comparative levels in different periods, the biased pattern of missing data is a concern. Countries differ in terms of their degrees of openness. Generally, small countries, especially peripheral ones, tend to have high levels of openness (or "trade dependence" as it has also been called). 
Weighting the Country Openness Scores to Estimate Trade Globalization
We must weight the country openness ratios so that the averages reflect the differential sizes of countries. The unweighted mean would erroneously assume that, for example, El Salvador and Mexico have the same importance in determining the world level of trade globalization. We weight each country 9 Of course, Maddison's (1995) basis for estimating total world exports and GDP also suffers from spatially incomplete evidence in the nineteenth century. 10 We excluded country/years in which the country had less than 1 million people; did not have data on imports, GDP, or population; reported data on imports and GDP in different currency units; or had obvious data errors that we could not reconcile. The data are mainly found in Mitchell (1992 Mitchell ( , 1993 Mitchell ( , 1995 Figure 3 shows the weighted and unweighted estimates of trade globalization for all the countries for which we have data. The Pearson's correlation between the weighted and the unweighted series is r = .84. The weighting is an important correction, especially in the decades since 1950 when many small countries enter the calculations. Most of these are peripheral countries with relatively high scores on openness. The unweighted series overestimates the world level of trade globalization because these small countries are weighted the same as large countries. 12 Because our most important contribution here is our new measure of trade globalization, we perform three tests: (1) We compare the average openness measure of trade globalization with the world total approach since 1950; (2) we examine constant groups of countries over time to see whether the patterns we find could be the result of changes in the composition of the "sample"; (3) we separate countries into core, peripheral, and semiperipheral groups to see whether they differ in average openness.
The results of these tests, presented in Section 2 of the online appendix (note 7), are reassuring in regard to the validity of the average openness measure. These tests show that peripheral countries have consistently 1 Weighting each country's score by the ratio of that country's population to the mean population of the countries in the sample for a particular year produces a measure in a similar metric to that of the unweighted scores and allows for comparison of samples of different sizes over time. This is arithmetically equivalent to weighting by the ratio of the country population to the sum of the populations of the countries for which we have data at each time point. 12 A reviewer suggested that economic size (GDP) might be a better weight than population size for the purpose of estimating a characteristic of the world economy. We calculated the weighted average openness measure using economic size, and the results are reported in Section 1 of the online appendix (see note 7). The correlation between the series weighted by population and the series weighted by economic size is .91. We conclude that there is indeed a trend as well as a cycle; this conclusion is not solely due to the addition of peripheral countries to the data. Looking only at the core countries (see Figure A- This is an important finding in light of how our estimation of the highest levels of the earlier peaks might have been affected had we had data on noncore countries early ona similar divergence between core and noncore might have occurred near the end of earlier waves. If that were so, the average level would have been higher than indicated by our estimated level, although we doubt that it would have been as high as the level reached by 1995. Note that the magnitude of the increase due to the trend is significant, but it is not a qualitative leap to a vastly different degree of global integration. There is simply no support for the idea that a completely new stage of global integration has emerged in recent years. Instead there is an unprecedented high level of integration, but not one that is of an entirely different magnitude than before.14 Our most surprising finding on trade globalization is the existence of three waves instead of two. Most studies of the world-system have recognized the late nineteenthcentury wave and compared it with the contemporary period. The patchy world-total data from Maddison (1995) We used the dates of the peaks and troughs of the residuals from the regression of average openness on time from 1815 to 1995 to examine the trends of subperiods. Table 1 presents coefficients for these alternating positive and negative subperiods, all of which are significant beyond the p < .001 level, supporting the idea that there are three waves. Figure 6 shows the trajectories for constant country groups for which we have data over the relevant time period. Holding groups constant (rather than adding cases as data become available) allows us to see the effects of changing the case base. We can also see what is happening to the different groups during the middle wave. 16 Somewhat different things happen with the different groups during the middle wave. The middle wave for the big three countries was not really a wave, but rather an oscillation around a relatively high level of openness.17 14 One problem with our estimation of the trend is that the international trade statistics do not distinguish between short-distance and long-distance trade. Trade between Switzerland and Germany is treated the same as trade between Switzerland and India. International trade has probably increased its reach in the sense that more trade goes farther now than it did in the nineteenth century, so we may be underestimating the trend toward truly globalized trade. One way to examine the extent of this problem would be to use data that show the countries from which imports have come. Imports could be weighted by distance to see how much difference this makes for our conclusions about the trend. 15 Krasner (1976:330) also found a middle wave, but his rose from 1900 to 1913 and then fell from 1918 to 1939. 16 The composition of these country groups is described in Section 2 of the online appendix (see note 7), where these groups are also used to examine the validity of our overall measure of trade globalization.
17 Examining the data series and the separate graphs for the different groups provides a clearer The groups of 7 and 14 countries had definite middle waves, but they started and ended at somewhat different times. 18 Thus, the middle wave was mixed in its composition and its temporality. 19 Of course, so were the first and third waves, but to a lesser extent. Figure A-7) .
EXPLANATIONS
18 For the group of 7 (the United States, Great Britain, and France plus Australia, Denmark, Italy, and Sweden), the first wave peaked in 1887, then declined somewhat and stayed down from 1897 to 1905 followed by a definite middle wave that rose from 1905, wiggled and soared to a single peak in 1921 that was higher than the earlier peak in 1887. Then the wave dropped, recovered a bit in 1927-1928, and then plunged with the rest.
The group of 14 adds Cuba, Spain, India, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, and Taiwan. The data on this group do not start until 1905 so we cannot see the great wave of the late nineteenth century. But from 1905 we see a flat wiggle with a very small drop during World War I, and a rise that began in 1918 and peaked in 1924, and then a sharp decline that slowed a bit from 1937 to 1939 and then declined until 1948. The group of 14 had a definite middle wave, but it was temporally later and shorter than that for the group of 7. The group of 24 has data only from 1927 on. The first three years, though, are tantalizingthey show an increase in openness from 1927 to 1929, then they plunge. Is this the tail of the middle wave? We do not know. '9 The standard deviation of the distribution of country openness is very high for the period from 1900 to 1914, indicating unusual diversity during this time.
compared to the steep descent in communications and transportation costs since 1795. The declining costs of long-distance transport and communications appear to be facilitating background factors that push trade globalization, but these costs cannot explain the periodic collapses of trade globalization because costs did not radically increase when trade globalization declined.
What about the cycles? Do they correspond temporally with other known cycles? Causality should be revealed in the temporal relationships among variables. Recalling Figure 1 , the contenders are the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers; the incidence of world wars; changes in the level of trade protection; waves of ideological integration promoted by a hegemonic core power; and waves of investment globalization. Other cycles that might be causally related to that of trade globalization are long business cycles (the Kuznets cycle and the Kondratieff Wave).
The hegemonic sequence has been quantitatively measured in terms of military power (or rather naval and air power) by Modelski and Thompson (1988) After 1879, the European states gradually slid back toward protectionism, while the British maintained low tariffs until 1914 despite huge political arguments over this policy (Taylor 1996) . Bairoch (1993:51) shows that the reintroduction of protectionism had no long-term negative effect on the growth of exports for those countries that went protectionist. In the second decade following their reintroduction of protectionism, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, and Switzerland all had higher rates of export growth than they had in the decade before they went protectionist, and this was also true for Europe as a whole. And the United Kingdom, where a liberal trade policy was maintained, had a declining rate of export growth over this same general period. Bairoch does not claim that protectionism causes globalization, but he does point to important evidence that trade liberalization did not cause globalization in the late nineteenth century.
Our average openness measure of worldlevel trade globalization also contradicts the hypothesis that trade liberalization causes globalization. The first wave of trade globalization began well before the European shift toward free trade. And the downturn in the early 1880s preceded by several years the readoption of protectionist policies by the European states.
Despite the common belief that the economic collapse of the 1930s was caused by protectionism, Bairoch (1993) The middle wave does not seem to fit the interpretation that waves of globalization correspond with the rise and fall of hegemonic core states. The middle wave occurred during a period of hegemonic rivalry. The British no longer had the economic power or the leadership prestige to set the standards for a globalizing world economy. The German challenge in World War I was unsuccessful and did not immediately lead to the emergence of a new hegemon because the United States refused to take upon itself the burden of leadership. The United States was the most economically powerful country in the world after World War I. And, although President Wilson and his supporters had a vi- 22 The United States also differs from other core powers in the extent to which it has implemented the policies of neoliberalism-downsizing, relocating production abroad, shrinking the middle class, and increasing relative inequalities within the country (Navarro 1998 This produced a huge vacuum at the center, and the economic crisis and powerful political challenges to liberal capitalism in the guise of Bolshevism and fascism broke the world order into another violent global struggle for power. After World War II, the United States did take up the mantle of hegemony, which then provided the institutional basis for a new wave of economic globalization.
In this interpretation, the falling costs of transportation and communication led to the middle wave, but the lack of an institutional guarantor of world order in the form of a hegemonic core state did not allow that wave to be consolidated and sustained. The middle wave was uneven in time and space, starting and ending in different years for different countries. In that respect it resembles the recent continuation of the third wave, and there is a similar problem in both periods. In the middle wave there was no hegemon, and in the decades since 1975 there has been a declining one.
Economic globalization creates a great demand for political globalization because markets are unable to resolve the problems of distributive justice and uneven development that they create (Polanyi 1957; Soros 1998 ). Of course, political globalization does not have to take the form of the hegemony of a single core state. It is possible that new or renewed international political organizations could provide an effective global proto-state with the power to adjudicate disputes and to balance and sustain the processes of economic growth. Something like the latter is likely to emerge if the world-system survives the next window of vulnerability to war among core states (Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1999). The question now is whether sufficient legitimate consensus will be constituted (either around a new or renewed hegemon or an emergent global state) to prevent the world-system from entering another period of violent hegemonic rivalry of the sort that was seen twice in the twentieth century. Such a new period of conflict would undoubtedly lower the level of trade globalization, but this would be more the consequence rather than the cause of rising conflicts.
Our study of trade globalization should be supplemented with a study of the long-run trajectory of investment globalization and other variables that allegedly affect globalization. Hypotheses about the causes and consequences of trade globalization should be tested by operationalizing other variables and performing statistical tests inferring causality, a task that we intend to take up. We also propose to study political globalization over time. Although this is more difficult than trade globalization both conceptually and empirically, it is an important task for understanding the processes of the past and possibilities for the future. In the meantime, our descriptive examination of trade globalization as operationalized by the new measure of average openness provides a fresh view of the continuities and changes in the structure of the modern world-system over the past two centuries. 
